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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ENID ALLEN I 
vs. 
Plaintiff/ 
Appellant, 
Case No. 15415 
GREYHOUND LINES I INC. I 
a corporation, 
Defendant/ 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case for personal injuries allegedly sus-
tained by the Plaintiff in Pocatello, Idaho on January 27, 1974 
while she was a passenger on Defendant's Greyhound Bus which 
was traveling from Ogden, Utah to Dillon, Montana. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After trial before the court, the District Judge, the 
Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment for the Defendant. The court found that 
Plaintiff's claim was barred by the limitation statutes of 
Idaho and Utah. She did not file her complaint within the two 
(2) year limitation provided by Section 5-219(4) Idaho Code and 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Idaho's limitation was a bar to her claim under Section 78-12-
45 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, because the plaintiff 
was not a citizen of Utah. The Court found that in August of 
1972 plaintiff had moved her residence to Montana and had an 
intention to remain there for an indefinite period of time. The 
court concluded that plaintiff was a domiciliary or citizen of 
Montana. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant prayed that the judgment of the District 
Court be affirmed. 
DEPOSITION BY THIS COURT 
This Court affirmed the District Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendant respectfully requests that the petition for 
rehearing be denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The evidence at trial concerning domicile was not 
materially in conflict. Without exception, all of the material 
evidence concerning domicile was presented to the court in the 
parties' briefs. This court found substantial, competent, 
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and admissible evidence to support the trial J'udge's f' d' 
in in,; 
that plaintiff's becoming a resident of Montana in 197 2, 
coupled with her intention to remain there for an indefi~~ 
period of time, constituted the establishment of domicile ii, 
Montana. 
following: 
Specifically, the trial court found, inter alia, t 
12. Plaintiff and her husband moved from 
Ogden, Utah to Dillon, Montana in August of 
1972 to manage and operate the motel business. 
At that time they had an intention to remain 
in Montana for an indefinite period of time. 
13. The management and operation of the 
motel required that plaintiff and her husband 
live in Dillon and be engaged full time in 
that business activity. However, they could 
have hired someone else to manage and operate 
the motel. Before and after they moved to 
Montana they have had the intention to manage 
and operate the motel and reside in the motel 
for an indefinite period of time. 
14. From August, 1972, to the present, 
the plaintiff and her husband have resided in 
a unit of the motel, which the plaintiff con-
sidered a regular home. 
* * * 
24. Plaintiff claims she will return to 
Ogden, Utah at some indefinite time in the 
future to reside. She also claims she will 
continue to reside for an indefinite period 
of time in Dill on, Montana, where she has a 
full-time business and home. (R. at 127, 128) 
On plaintiff's petition for rehearing her counsel 
1 · ·ff d h husband were to assume the claims that the p ainti an er 
l on "a limited management duties of the Dillon, Montana mote 
-3-
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basis" and he emphasizes one fact. Plaintiff's counsel empha-
sizes that she voted in Utah by absentee ballot in the 1972 
general election and she voted in Utah in the 1974 general 
election. In the 1976 general election she voted in Montana. 
Plaintiff's counsel ignores all other probative facts of plaintiff's 
intent, including plaintiff's admission that she established 
residence in Montana and had an intent to reside in Montana for 
an indefinite period. Plaintiff's admission was consistent 
with all other probative facts of intent and her eventually 
voting in the general election in Montana. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE LAW TO 
THE MATERIAL FACTS IN THIS CASE. 
Plaintiff claims that this court misconstrued the 
facts of this case. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that this 
court failed to recognize and give proper emphasis to the fact 
that Plaintiff voted in Utah after she moved to Dillon, Montana. 
This is a curious argument in light of the record before court. 
Plaintiff's voting record has never been unclear. 
The district court found that Plaintiff became a registered 
voter in Montana and voted in Montana in the last presidential 
election. (R. at 127) Plaintiff noted twice in her brief that 
this election was in 1976. (Appellants Brief on appeal at 
-4-
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pages 3 and 5.) Plaintiff referred to her voting record in 
Utah a total of six separate times in her brief. (Appellant 
Brief at pp. 3, 5, 13, 14, 19, and 20.) 
Defendant never denied that Plaintiff was a 
re gist, 
voter in Utah. (Respondent's Brief on appeal at page 13.) 
Instead, Defendant argued that the Utah voting record was~ 
dispositive when it is balanced with the overwhelming evidenc 
of Montana domicile or citizenship. Apparently, counsel for 
the plaintiff is either trying to re argue his case, substituf 
his judgment for the trial judge's concerning the weight to; 
given particular facts, or he is misreading this courts opin1 
concerning the material facts and applicable law. 
It appears to defendant that this court was not 
confused about the facts in the case. The opinion of this 
court supports that conclusion. This court said: 
The evidence at trial was not materially in 
conflict. Plaintiff and her husband own a 
dwelling in Ogden, Utah, in which they resided 
for a number of years. They moved to Dillon, 
Montana, in 1972 to become live-in managers 
and operators of a motel in which they had 
acquired an ownership interest. Their daughter 
resides in their house in Ogden and they stay 
with her on periodic visits in Utah. Plaintiff 
was returning to Dillon after such a visit and 
was injured as a result of a bus accident which 
occurred in Pocatello, Idaho, on January 27, 
1974. This suit was filed on June 2, 1976, more 
than two years after the cause of action arose. 
Plaintiff readily admits: ( 1) having estab-
lished a residence in Montana; (2) having 
become a member of a church congregation in 
-5-
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Montana where she pays tithes; (3) not paying 
resident Utah income taxes; (4) having licensed 
a vehicle in Montana and paying license fees 
and personal property taxes thereon; and (5) 
being a registered voter in Montana and exer-
cising her voting privilege there. (Emphasis 
added) 
The controversy as to domicile arises simply 
by reason of plaintiff's declaration that she 
is still a Utah domiciliary and that at some 
indefinite time in the future she intends to 
return to Utah and again reside here. 
Faced with the foregoing facts, the trial 
judge determined that plaintiff's residence in 
Montana, coupled with her intention to remain 
for an indefinite period of time, constituted 
the establishment of domicile. That decision 
finds ample support in the evidence and it 
should not be overturned simply because we or 
other judges might have interpreted the facts 
differently. The trial judge apparently placed 
greater weight upon plaintiff's activities than 
upon her declaration of intent to remain a 
domiciliary of Utah as it was clearly his pre-
rogative to do as fact-finder. 
Further, this court's application of the law to the 
facts was correct. Plaintiff admitted that she established her 
residence in Montana when she moved there in 1972, and had an 
intention to remain in Montana for an indefinite period of time. 
All other probative facts supported that intent. This Court 
was correct in ruling that those facts, taken in their entirety, 
constituted the establishment of domicile in Montana from 
August 1972 until the time of trial. 
-6-
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rehearing. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should deny plaint;ff's · ~ petition for 
DATED this 25th day of September, 1978 . 
. ';z[v;z:,t~f?lti?4°/v 
L. 'Ridd' Larson -
I 
"---'/ \ 
\ 
James w. Gilson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Greyhound Lines, Inc. 
CERTFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing 
Respondent's Memorandum in Response to Petition for Rehearin~ 
was served this ~!) day of September, 1978, by mailing on 
said date a copy thereof by United States Mail, first class 
postage prepaid addressed to Richard Richards, Attorney for 
Appellant, 2506 Madison Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
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